Recently in this Journal Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) proposed a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of perfect competition and two industries, GRH assume Bertrand competition and a continuum of industries. GRH conclude that the equilibrium is unique if transport costs are low, that there is no trade for high transport costs, and that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies when transport costs are intermediate. In this note we reexamine the equilibrium analysis under di¤erent transport costs for a single industry (partial equilibrium) version of GRH's model. We con…rm many of GRH's results, but also …nd that there are circumstances under which there are multiple equilibria, including equilibria in which trade patterns run counter to "natural" comparative advantage, and also …nd that there is a pro…table deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH for intermediate trading costs. We propose an alternative set of strategies for this case and establish that they constitute an equilibrium.
1 Introduction Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010, henceforth GRH) propose a novel way to think about the implications of international trade in the presence of national external economies at the industry level. Instead of a model with two industries and perfect competition, as in the standard treatment in the literature, GRH postulate a model with a continuum of industries and Bertrand competition. These authors argue that with these alternative assumptions the "pathologies" of the standard treatment are eliminated. In particular, the equilibrium is typically unique with trade patterns consistent with "natural" comparative advantage 1 .
This is most clearly the case with frictionless trade, which the authors use to make their main points. The authors then explore how the results change when transportation costs are positive. They show that the previous results remain valid when trading costs are low enough, while for high enough trading costs the equilibrium entails no trade. However, there is a range of high trading costs for which there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies. For this case, GRH postulate a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which …rms in the country with the comparative advantage mix over two strategies: the "global strategy", in which …rms target the world market with a pair of prices (one for the home market and one for the foreign market), and the "domestic strategy", in which …rms target only the domestic market. Firms in the other country pursue a pure strategy in which they target their domestic market.
In this note we show that there is a pro…table deviation to the mixed-strategy equilibrium postulated by GRH, and then propose an alternative set of strategies and establish that they constitute an equilibrium. The main di¤erence is that …rms in the country with the comparative advantage, when pursuing the global strategy, randomize across a continuum of prices for the domestic market rather than posting a single price for that market. However, this mixed-strategy equilibrium applies only to an industry in which a country has a strong enough ("superior") comparative advantage. Otherwise, …rms in the country without the comparative advantage …nd it pro…table to deviate and target the global market. Characterizing the equilibrium for the case in which comparative advantage is not "superior"goes beyond the scope of this comment.
As part of this note, we also provide a formal analysis of the equilibrium con…gurations under di¤erent transport costs for a single industry that exhibits Marshallian externalities.
We con…rm GRH's result that for low trading costs there is complete specialization, for high enough trading costs there is no trade, and that there is a range of high trading costs for which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. However, in contrast to GRH, we demonstrate that when transport costs are low, the equilibrium entails complete specialization, but is not necessarily unique. This implies that trade patterns need not be consistent with "natural" comparative advantage, and hence, as in the standard treatment in the literature, national external economies at the industry level still o¤er a theoretical basis for industrial policy, a point which we develop in Lyn and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) .
The Model
For our purposes we consider a partial equilibrium version of the model presented by GRH.
This allows for greater expositional simplicity, while capturing all the main features of the problem at hand. 2 There are two countries, Home and Foreign, labor is the only factor of production, wages are exogenous and …xed at w and w , and we focus on a single good with demand curves x(p) and x (p ) that have a unitary price elasticity, so that x(p) = E p and
, where E and E are total expenditure levels. The production technology has increasing returns to scale due to external economies at the local level. In Home a X units of labor are required to produce a unit of output, where a > 0 is an exogenous productivity parameter, X is the total production of the good in Home net of any trade costs (see below), and . There are two identical …rms in Home and two identical …rms in Foreign. Transport costs are of the "iceberg"type, so that delivering a unit of the good from one country to the other requires shipping t > 1 units. 4 Markets are segmented, so that …rms can set arbitrarily di¤erent prices across both markets. Firms engage in Bertrand competition in each market. For simplicity we restrict the analysis to the case in which demand is symmetric in the two countries, E = E . Without loss of generality we set E = E = 1.
As in GRH, we study three types of equilibria: complete specialization (i.e., …rms from one country supply both markets); mixed strategy equilibria (i.e., …rms from one country randomize over which markets to serve and the price to charge, while …rms from the other country o¤er to serve their own market at the autarky price); no trade (i.e., …rms from each country serve only their own market). All proofs are in the online Appendix.
Complete specialization equilibrium
Let p 0 be de…ned implicitly by
We will use x and x as shorthand for x(p 0 ) and x (tp 0 ), respectively.
3 Given our primitives, the assumption that < 1 2 implies pro…ts are increasing in prices -a crucial point when deriving the equilibrium conditions.
4 By assuming X is total production net of trade costs we are essentially treating "iceberg" transport costs as "true"costs. This is consistent with the assumptions in GRH. Treating X as gross production would be more consistent with a literal interpretation of some production (t 1) melting away in transit.
and "
wat
then there is an equilibrium where both markets are supplied by Home …rms, with prices p 0 and p 0 tp 0 at Home and Foreign, respectively.
In the proof of this lemma we …rst establish that pro…ts are increasing in prices. This implies that the best possible deviation entails "shaving" prices p 0 and p 0 , i.e., it is never optimal to charge strictly lower prices than p 0 and p 0 . Since prices p 0 and p 0 = tp 0 imply that Home …rms make zero pro…ts in both markets, it follows that a Home …rm cannot make positive pro…ts with any alternative set of prices, implying that that there is no pro…table deviation for a Home …rm. The proof then turns to Foreign …rms, establishing that (i) …rms from Foreign do not make positive pro…ts by taking over the world market by undercutting Home …rms in both markets, and that (ii) …rms from Foreign do not make positive pro…ts by displacing Home …rms from the Foreign market. Condition (i) is a guaranteed by (2) and condition (ii) is guaranteed by (3).
To proceed, let = wa w a , g(t)
t+t 1 2 and h(t) t 1 (1 + t) . It is easy to show that (2) and (3) are equivalent to g(t) and h(t), respectively. Let g (t)
and
. Let e t be implicitly de…ned by g( e t) = h( e t), let t CS ( ) and t CS ( ) be implicitly de…ned by = h(t CS ) and = h (t CS ), respectively, and let t 0 ( ) be implicitly de…ned by = g (t 0 ). We say that Home has a "strong" comparative advantage if < g ( e t) while we say that Home has a "weak"comparative advantage if g ( e t) < 1. Figure I ).
This Proposition con…rms GRH's result that for any industry there are transport costs which are low enough that the equilibrium is unique and entails complete specialization.
However, this proposition also shows that there are conditions under which multiple complete specialization equilibria arise. The reason for this multiplicity is that trade costs create a wedge in prices, thereby making the distribution of sales across countries di¤erent for each equilibria: in the equilibrium in which Home …rms capture the global market, prices are low in Home and high in Foreign, and the opposite happens in the equilibrium in which Foreign …rms capture the market. This makes it harder for a deviant …rm to make pro…ts.
For concreteness, imagine that t 2 [t 0 ( ); t CS ( )] and Home has a weak comparative advantage, and consider the equilibrium in which Foreign …rms supply the world market. A Home …rm may contemplate shaving prices in both markets in order to capture the global market. Since comparative advantage is weak, however, this deviation entails losses from sales overseas because of the need to sell at a low price in the Foreign market together with the existence of trade costs. The realization of economies of scale thanks to capturing the global market leads to lower costs and hence pro…ts from domestic sales, but this is not enough to compensate for the losses incurred from sales overseas. The deviation is then not pro…table, so a situation in which …rms from the country without the comparative advantage dominate the global market is an equilibrium. An important implication is that for this case trade patterns need not be consistent with "natural"comparative advantage.
Equilibrium with no trade
Let p A and p A be de…ned implicitly by
, respectively. We will use x A and x A as shorthand for x(p A ) and x (p A ), respectively.
Lemma 2 If
" wa
then there is an equilibrium with no trade.
Recall that the best possible deviation entails "shaving" prices. Hence, (4) guarantees that a deviation by a Home …rm to target the global market is unpro…table, while (5) assures the same regarding a Foreign deviant …rm. Let f (z) 2 1+z
Using our assumptions on primitives we can rewrite (4) and (5) as t t N T ( ) and t t N T ( ), respectively.
Proposition 2 An equilibrium with no trade exists if and only if
Letting l(t) (t N T ) 1 (t) and l (t) (t N T ) 1 (t), the conditions t t N T ( ) and t t N T ( ) are equivalent to l(t) and l (t), respectively. See Figure II .
Equilibrium with mixed strategies
As in GRH, our analysis con…rms that there is a range of high transport costs for which there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. For this case, condition (2) is satis…ed but conditions (3) and (4) are not -the violation of (3) implies that complete specialization in Home is not an equilibrium because Foreign …rms would deviate to displace Home …rms from their local market, and the violation of (4) implies that no trade is not an equilibrium because Home …rms would deviate and seize both markets. Figure III shows how this corresponds to the range of transport costs t 2 (t CS ( ); t N T ( )) for 1.
GRH argue that for this range of transport costs there exists an equilibrium in which
Home …rms randomize between a strategy that leads to only sales in Home (the local strategy) and a strategy that ensures sales in both markets (the global strategy). The challenge in constructing such an equilibrium is that Home sales are pro…table while sales in Foreign entail a loss, so Home …rms would be tempted to shave the Home price, thereby capturing all the pro…ts associated with local sales while sharing the losses in the Foreign market. In fact, the equilibrium proposed by GRH can be shown to allow for a pro…table deviation along these lines. 
Pro…table Deviation to the Mixed Strategy proposed by GRH
denote the global pro…ts for Home …rms given prices p and p , and note for future reference
We proceed in two steps. As a …rst step, we show that (p G ) > 0 and (p G ) < 0 implying that Home …rms make pro…ts in Home and losses in Foreign. Consider the price p 0 . The violation of condition (3) implies that tp 0 > p A , so charging tp 0 in Foreign cannot be part of an equilibrium. 5 Since pro…ts are increasing in prices (i.e., 1 ; 2 > 0) and 5 To see this, note that the violation of (3) implies w a (x (tp0)) < wat (x(p0)+x (tp0)) = tp 0 ; while we know that
. Then we have f (tp 0 ) < tp 0 and f (p A ) = p A . Since f (p) intersects p only once and from above (by Assumption < 1 2 ) then it follows that f (p) < p if and only if p > p A . This (p 0 ; p 0 ) = 0, then (p G ; p A ) = 0 with p A < tp 0 requires p G > p 0 . Note also that tp 0 > p A implies (p 0 ) < 0 since it would be zero if …rms could charge tp 0 in Foreign but now they must charge an even lower price p A . Since (p) is decreasing (i.e., pro…ts in Foreign are decreasing in the Home price) and p G > p 0 , we then conclude that (p G ) < 0 and from
As a second step, we show that (p G ) < 0 implies that there exists a pro…table deviation to the proposed strategy. Let the probability of choosing the local strategy be q, and consider a deviation to a pure strategy with price in Foreign equal to p A and the local price just below p G , say at p 0 just below p G . The pro…ts under the deviation are q 
An Alternative Mixed Strategy
We now propose an alternative mixed strategy equilibrium that holds when Home has a "superior comparative advantage", where we use "superior"rather than "strong"(used before) because the two concepts are di¤erent. We say that Home has a superior comparative advantage if < l ( b t), where b t is de…ned implicitly by h( b t) = l ( b t) (see Figure III) .
Assume again that (2) is satis…ed, whereas (3) and (4) are both violated. For this case, we propose the following equilibrium. As in the equilibrium proposed by GRH, Foreign …rms do not export and charge a price p A , while with probability q Home …rms pursue the local strategy of not exporting and charging a local price of p A . The only di¤erence is in the global strategy of Home …rms (pursued with probability 1 q): just as in GRH this entails shaving price p A in the Foreign market, however the domestic price p is now drawn from the immediately implies that tp 0 > p A .
6 Note that the "2"in the expression (p 0 ) 2 arises because of our assumption of two …rms in each market. distribution
with support p 2 [s; p A ], where
; and M (y) exp
It is easy to verify that F (s) = 0, F (p A ) = 1 and F 0 (p) > 0. The mixing probability q is given by,
Finally, s is determined implicitly by (8) and
Formally, Proposition 3 Assume that Home has a superior comparative advantage, i.e., < l ( b t), where b t is de…ned implicitly by h( b t) = l ( b t). For t 2 (t CS ( ); t N T ( )) the equilibrium entails Foreign …rms charging p A in Foreign and making no sales in Home, and Home …rms following a mixed strategy where with probability q they follow the "local strategy" according to which they charge p A in Home and make no sales in Foreign and with probability 1 q they follow the "global strategy" according to which they shave p A in Foreign and charge a price p 2 [s; p A ]
in Home according to the distribution F (p) in (7), with q and s satisfying (8) and (9).
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